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Abstract
Using a sample of 137 hospitals over the period 1998-2002 in the English National
Health Service, we estimate the elasticity of hospital costs with respect to waiting
times. Our cross-sectional and panel-data results suggest that at the sample mean
(103 days), waiting times have no signi￿cant e⁄ect on hospitals￿costs or, at most, a
positive one. If signi￿cant, the elasticity of cost with respect to waiting time from our
cross-sectional estimates is in the range 0.4-1. The elasticity is still positive but lower
in our ￿xed-e⁄ects speci￿cations (0.2-0.4). In all speci￿cations, the e⁄ect of waiting
time on cost is non-linear, suggesting a U-shaped relationship between hospital costs
and waiting times: the level of waiting time which minimises total costs is always
below ten days.
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11 Introduction
Waiting times are a major policy issue in many OECD countries. Average waiting times
range between four and eight months for common procedures like cataract and hip re-
placement. There are at least two rationales for explaining the existence of waiting times.
The ￿rst is that waiting times act as a rationing mechanism that help to bring into equi-
librium the demand for and the supply of health care (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984;
Martin and Smith, 1999; Cullis, Jones and Propper, 2000): in the absence of price ra-
tioning and if bene￿t from treatment is to some extent unobservable, waiting times may
deter patients with small bene￿t from asking for treatment. A second rationale is that
waiting times reduce the cost of provision of elective surgery. When demand is stochastic,
waiting times may reduce idle capacity, therefore inducing a more e¢ cient use of resources
(Iversen 1993, Iversen 1997, Barros and Olivella 2005). This argument is likely to hold
when waiting times are low: hospital cost reduces with waiting times as a consequence
of the lower excess capacity. However, as suggested by Iversen (1993), there might be a
point over which higher waiting times increase costs, which may be due to the higher costs
of managing the waiting list. For example when waiting times are very long, there might
be an increase in the resources needed for repeated examinations of patients (since their
status might change during the course of the waiting), an increase in treatment costs and
in length of stay (if severity deteriorates while waiting), and an increase in cancellation
rates. There is therefore, at least theoretically, a level of waiting time which minimises
total costs. Above this level, higher waiting times increase hospital costs.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically estimate the elasticity of hospital costs with
respect to waiting times. We use a sample of 137 acute hospitals over the period 1998-2002
in the English National Health Service (NHS). Our cross-sectional and panel-data results
suggest that at the sample mean (103 days), waiting times have no signi￿cant e⁄ect on
hospitals￿costs or, at most, a positive one. If signi￿cant, the elasticity of cost with respect
to waiting time in our cross-sectional estimates is in the range 0.4-1. The elasticity is
still positive but lower in our ￿xed-e⁄ects speci￿cations (0.2-0.4). In all speci￿cations the
2e⁄ect of waiting time on cost is non-linear, suggesting a U-shaped relationship between
hospital costs and waiting times, which is consistent with the Iversen (1993) model. The
level of waiting times which minimises total costs is always below ten days.
Our results therefore suggest that the level of waiting times observed in our sam-
ple is above the one which minimises total costs. If healthcare providers could ration
the demand by dumping or neglecting treatment to patients with low expected bene￿t
(explicit rationing), we should not observe providers with waiting times held above the
cost-minimising level. However, if waiting times also have a rationing role, then waiting
times might as well be above the cost-minimising level. There might be several reasons
why explicit rationing might not be feasible for the providers: the bene￿t for the patients
might be at least to some extent unobservable; even if bene￿t is perfectly observable,
patients with low expected bene￿t might feel entitled to treatment in the NHS: clinicians
might therefore prefer to add patients on the waiting list, rather than taking responsibility
for explicitly declining treatment to patients. Therefore, our model indirectly supports the
theories that model waiting time as a demand-rationing mechanism.
The study is organised as follows. The next section presents the methods. Section 3
describes the data. The results are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Methods
De￿ne C as the total cost of a representative hospital, w as the waiting time of the patients
admitted for treatment, and y as the number of patients treated. Following Iversen (1993,
1997), the cost function of a hospital can be represented by
C = C(w;y) (1)
with Cy > 0: higher activity increases costs; Cw < 0 if w < e w, Cw = 0 if w = e w and
Cw > 0 if w > e w. The relationship between waiting times and costs is U-shaped: waiting
times reduce costs for low levels of waiting times, while waiting times increase costs for
3high levels of waiting times. Iversen (1993, 1997) argues that for low waiting times, higher
waiting times reduce hospital costs, as a consequence of lower excess capacity: if the
demand for health care is stochastic, higher waiting times reduce the probability that the
system has idle capacity and therefore reduce costs (for a formal model with a stochastic
demand function and the e⁄ect of waiting times on idle capacity, see also Goddard, Malek
and Tavakoli (1995); Olivella (2003) also assumes that waiting times reduce costs because
waiting times allow for a more e¢ cient use of hospital equipment).
Iversen (1993) suggests that there is a level of waiting times over which higher waiting
times increase costs. For high waiting times, the reductions in costs from a marginal
increase in waiting, in terms of lower probability of idle capacity, become negligible. In
contrast, for high waiting times, a marginal increase in waiting may increase the costs
of managing the waiting list: for example, more resources might be needed for repeated
examination of patients (if the health status of the patients deteriorates in the course of
the waiting); treatment costs might increase due to higher cancellations rates if patients
scheduled for treatment have in the meanwhile found treatment somewhere else; therefore
overall prioritisation costs will be higher when waiting times are higher.
There is then, at least theoretically, a level of waiting time which minimises total costs.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate empirically the relationship between hospital costs
and waiting times. As far as the authors are aware, this paper is the ￿rst that estimates
empirically such a relationship. We estimate three types of regressions: pooled OLS, panel
￿xed e⁄ects and panel random e⁄ects. The pooled OLS model is given by:




t￿3 + uit (2)
where Cit is the cost of hospital i at year t, wit is waiting time, yit is a vector of outputs; xit
is a vector of control variables, dt is a vector of time dummies, and uit is the idiosyncratic
error. According to the theoretical literature discussed above, we should expect ￿1 < 0
and ￿2 ￿ 0.
An alternative approach is to assume that individual e⁄ects are speci￿c to each obser-
4vation. This leads to the ￿xed e⁄ects model:




t￿3 + uit (3)
The hospital-speci￿c ￿xed-e⁄ects ￿i capture individual unobserved heterogeneity. An
alternative to the ￿xed e⁄ects is the random-e⁄ects models, where ￿i v N(￿;￿2
￿) and
uit v N(0;￿2
"): In this formulation the individual e⁄ects are randomly iid distributed over
the population of hospitals. Fixed-e⁄ects and random-e⁄ects models can be compared by
the Hausman test, which tests for systematic di⁄erences in coe¢ cients between the two
models (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
It might be argued that the relationship between costs and waiting times is endogenous.
If a hospital has high costs, it is more likely to have longer waiting times. There are several
channels through which this may happen.
First, more ine¢ cient hospitals have higher costs (due for example to poor manage-
ment): if higher ine¢ ciency also implies higher ine¢ ciency in the management of the
waiting list, then ine¢ cient hospitals may have both higher costs and higher waiting times
(a positive correlation). If the researcher has no access to variables correlated with in-
e¢ ciency, then the OLS estimates of Equation (2) will be biased upwards. We use at
least two control variables that might be correlated with ine¢ ciency: length of stay and
proportion of day cases. Keeping other factors constant, more ine¢ cient providers have a
higher length of stay and a smaller proportion of day cases.
Second, hospitals with higher quality might have a higher cost and at the same time
attract a higher number of patients, which leads to a higher waiting time (again, a positive
correlation). We use at least two control variables that might be correlated with quality:
length of stay and (age and gender adjusted) readmission rates. Keeping other factors
constant, providers with higher quality should have a higher length of stay and lower
readmission rates.
If there is some residual unobserved e¢ ciency and quality, the OLS might still be
biased. However, by estimating a ￿xed e⁄ects model, all unobserved ine¢ ciency and
5unobserved quality will be captured by the individual ￿xed e⁄ects, as long as quality and
ine¢ ciency are time invariant, which seems plausible over short intervals of time.
3 Data
The sample comprises 137 English NHS acute hospitals observed annually between 1998/1999
and 2001/2002, making an unbalanced panel with 440 observations.
The data were collected from several sources, including the Hospital Episodes Statistics
(HES), the Department of Health (DoH), the National Health Service Information Au-
thority (NHSIA) and Dr Foster, the independent organization that provides information
on the quality of health services.
Our dependent variable is total hospital cost, measured in thousands of Pounds Ster-
ling. It was compiled from the Department of Health and was transformed into real values
for 2002 using the GDP de￿ ator provided by HM Treasury. Our measure of waiting times
is the mean wait for elective admissions, which was provided by HES. It measures the
average number of days between the decision of being admitted to the waiting list and the
actual admission for treatment.
Table 1 provides a description of the variables employed in the analysis and correspond-
ing sources of data. We divide the explanatory variables into six groups. Hospital activity
is measured by the total number of inpatient spells and the total number of outpatient
attendances. Both variables are measured in 1,000 cases. A second group of variables
captures the severity of cases treated by the hospital and the demand on resources. It
includes emergency admissions as a proportion of total spells and a HRG (Healthcare Re-
source Group) casemix index based on reference costs (this is equivalent to the case-mix
adjustments based on DRGs in other countries, like the Medicare Programme in the US
or Italy).
Hospital costs also depend on the e¢ ciency in the use of resources. We control for the
number of day cases as a proportion of elective surgeries and the average length of stay.
More e¢ cient hospitals are expected to have a higher proportion of surgeries carried out
6on a day case basis, and a lower average length of stay. The capital stock is proxied by
the number of available beds (Vita, 1990; Jacobs, Smith and Street, 2006, p.31) .
The quality of services is proxied by the percentage of emergency readmissions within
28 days from treatment. This variable is standardised by age and gender. Finally, the
degree of competition in the geographical market is measured through the number of
hospitals within a 20km radius (Propper, Burgess and Green, 2004; Siciliani and Martin,
2007). We do not include salaries because information is not readily available. Also,
salaries are nationally agreed and therefore there is little variation in salary expenditure
across hospitals.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics. The average hospital in the sample has
a total cost of just below £105 million per year and an average waiting time for elective
surgery of 103 days. It provides around 56,000 inpatient spells and 215,600 outpatient
attendances, and faces the competition of 4.5 other hospitals in a 20km radius. Around
36% of inpatient spells are originated as emergency attendances, and the average HRG
casemix index is at 93.7 (with a higher inidex indicating a more complex mix of cases).
With respect to the e¢ ciency of resource use, each hospital admits on average 50% of the
elective patients as day cases, with an average length of stay of 5.3 days. The proportion
of emergency readmissions within 28 days is around 6%.
With the exception of emergency admissions, readmissions and day cases, all the other
continuous variables (including total cost and waiting times) are included in the log scale,
which reduces skewness and allows the interpretation of coe¢ cients as elasticities. Emer-
gency admissions, readmissions and day cases are kept in levels. Since they are measured
as percentages, the associated coe¢ cients can also be interpreted as elasticities. After the
log transformation, the mean total cost in the sample is equal to the median.
4 Results
The results of the regression analysis for pooled OLS and ￿xed e⁄ects are reported in
tables 3 and 4. The dependent variable in both regressions is the log of total hospital cost
7(lntotcost) in real values of 2002.
Table 3 shows the OLS results for seven di⁄erent speci￿cations. We add regressors
progressively in order to test the stability of results. The basic regression (column (1))
includes mean waiting times (linear and quadratic e⁄ect) and activity indicators (inpatient
spells and outpatient attendances), and controls for the HRG index, London e⁄ect and
year. We then progressively add controls for capital stock (available beds (2)), demand
on resources (emergency admissions (3)), e¢ ciency on use of resources (daycases (4) and
average length of stay (5)), quality of service (emergency readmissions (6)) and competition
(number of competitors in a 20 km radius (7)). Given the limited coverage of our sample,
the inclusion of the quality and competition indicators reduces signi￿cantly the number
of observations. In Table 4 there are only six speci￿cations for panel regressions because
the competition indicator, the HRG index and the London dummy either do not vary or
vary little over time, which prevents ￿xed e⁄ects estimations.
We initially estimated the regressions using a translog speci￿cation, which is a second-
order Taylor approximation adding squared terms for the activity indicators. However,
since the square and cross terms were not signi￿cant (apart from the squared waiting-time
e⁄ect), we decided to exclude them from the ￿nal speci￿cation. The OLS regressions were
estimated using standard errors robust to both heteroscedasticity and the serial correlation
among observations of the same hospital over the years. Thus we report both the total
number of observations (N) and the number of clusters (N clusters).
Table 3 reports pooled cross-section estimates using unbalanced samples. By ￿ unbal-
anced￿we mean that as additional regressors are added the sample size decreases, falling
from 440 observations in the basic regression to 319 observations in the regression with all
independent variables.
All the regressions have been estimated with both linear and quadratic e⁄ects for
waiting times, which allows us to control for nonlinearities in the hospital cost response
to waiting times. Two reasons guided the choice of this functional form. First, it gives a
direct test of Iversen￿ s suggestion of a nonlinear e⁄ect of waiting times. As explained in
8Section 2, we should expect to ￿nd a negative coe¢ cient for low levels of waiting times and
a positive coe¢ cient for high levels. Second, the inclusion of a quadratic e⁄ect of waiting
times eliminates misspeci￿cation problems. In all the speci￿cations in Table 3 the RESET
test is not signi￿cant, which suggests that the functional form is correctly speci￿ed.
Let us now focus on the coe¢ cients estimated by the regressions, starting with waiting
times. In all regressions the coe¢ cient for the linear component is negative, while the
quadratic is positive. This implies that waiting times have an initial negative impact on
costs. However, after some point the e⁄ect is reversed and waiting times start to increase
costs. Therefore, in principle there is an optimal level of waiting times that minimises
total costs (this optimal level is calculated below).
Although the e⁄ect of waiting times is consistent with the theory, the estimated coe¢ -
cients are not always statistically signi￿cant. In the basic regression (column (1) of Table
3), the estimated e⁄ect of waiting times is not signi￿cant, either jointly or separately.
However, the other variables display signi￿cant e⁄ects. As expected, both inpatient and
outpatient activity increase cost, as does the HRG index. On average, hospitals costs
in London are approximately 20% higher than in the rest of the country. Real costs in-
creased signi￿cantly between 1998 and 1999, possibly due to nation-wide salary increases
from 1999/2000 onwards.
Adding available beds (column (2)) a⁄ects the results, and the coe¢ cients of waiting
times become signi￿cant. The e⁄ect of available beds, our proxy for capital, is itself
positive in all regressions where it is included.
The introduction of emergency admissions or day cases does not a⁄ect the results
signi￿cantly (see columns 3 and 4). Emergency admissions have no e⁄ect on hospital
costs. Day cases have a negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient, suggesting that hospitals with
a higher proportion of elective admissions treated as day cases have lower costs. In column
(5), we add average length of stay, which has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on hospital
costs, as expected. The e⁄ect of waiting times is not altered and the RESET test is still
not signi￿cant.
9Next we include readmission rates (column (6)), which has a positive but not statis-
tically signi￿cant e⁄ect on hospital cost. In sharp contrast with previous speci￿cations,
the e⁄ects of waiting times and available beds cease to be signi￿cant. One possible ex-
planation for this result is that adding readmission rates causes a sizable reduction in
the sample, making the e⁄ect of waiting time insigni￿cant. Another explanation is that
lower readmission rates (higher quality) generate both higher costs and higher waiting
times (through lower demand). But column (7) suggests that the e⁄ect of readmission has
no signi￿cant e⁄ect on costs. Also the positive coe¢ cient on readmission rates suggests
that lower readmission would reduce costs (in contrast with what we would expect). We
therefore favour the ￿rst explanation.
Finally we evaluate the e⁄ect of local competition from other hospitals (column (7)).
The estimated e⁄ect of competition is negative, although not signi￿cant.
From Table 3 it is not immediate to infer whether the e⁄ect of waiting time on costs is
positive or negative when evaluated at the sample mean. Recall that at the sample mean
the waiting time is 102:9 days. Di⁄erentiating the equation in Column (3), we obtain
"C
w = @ logCit=@ logwit = ￿0:93 + 2 ￿ 0:21 ￿ log(102:9) = 1:02. Therefore, the elasticity
of cost with respect to waiting time is markedly positive. Using similar computations, we
can show that the elasticity is smaller for Column (5), "C
w = 0:75, and even smaller for
Column (7), "C
w = 0:37.
It is also of interest to calculate the level of waiting time which minimises total costs.
By setting @ logCit=@ logwit = 0 from Columns (3), (5) and (7) we obtain a waiting time
respectively equal to 9:2, 9:8 and 7:4 days. Therefore, if waiting times reduce costs for low
levels of waiting times, this e⁄ect vanishes after waiting time has reached less than ten
days.
In addition to the pooled cross-sectional analysis we also estimate ￿xed- and random-
e⁄ects panel regressions. Results from the ￿xed-e⁄ects estimations are reported in Table 4.
Notice that the time-invariant regressors (like London dummy and number of competitors)
are excluded from the ￿xed-e⁄ects regressions. The e⁄ect of waiting times estimated by
10￿xed-e⁄ects is qualitatively similar to the pooled OLS case, with a negative coe¢ cient
for the linear component and a positive coe¢ cient for the quadratic one. However, the
coe¢ cients are not signi￿cant (although jointly signi￿cant in Columns (1) and (2)). This
might be due to the ine¢ ciency of the ￿xed-e⁄ects estimator. A more e¢ cient model is
the random-e⁄ects estimator but this will give unbiased estimates only if the individual-
speci￿c e⁄ects are not correlated with the independent variables. The Hausman test
rejects the random e⁄ects model: individual-speci￿c e⁄ects are therefore correlated with
independent variables. Nevertheless, the random-e⁄ects model might provide an idea
on the degree of ine¢ ciency of the ￿xed-e⁄ects model. We therefore report in Table 5
also the random e⁄ects estimations. In most speci￿cations the e⁄ect of waiting times is
signi￿cant and in accordance with the hypothesis proposed by Iversen (1993). The linear
coe¢ cient of waiting times is negative, but the quadratic one is positive, suggesting that
increasing waiting times up to a certain level decreases costs, but past this level the e⁄ect
is reversed. The elasticity of cost with respect to waiting time ("C
w = @ logCit=@ logwit)
is always positive at the sample mean for both the ￿xed and the random e⁄ects models,
respectively in the range 0.21-0.37 for the ￿xed e⁄ects and 0.31-0.85 for the random e⁄ects.
Again, the level of waiting time which minimises total costs is below ten days.
5 Conclusions and policy implications
Waiting times are a signi￿cant feature of several healthcare systems. This paper has
investigated the e⁄ect of waiting times on hospital costs. Iversen (1993) has argued that
for low waiting times, higher waiting times reduce costs due to lower idle capacity, but
there might be a point over which higher waiting times increase costs, due to the higher
costs of managing the waiting list. Using a sample of 137 acute hospitals over the period
1998-2002 in the English National Health Service (NHS) we have tested empirically the
relationship between hospital costs and waiting times. Our cross-sectional and panel-
data results suggest that at the sample mean (103 days), waiting times have no signi￿cant
e⁄ect on hospitals￿costs or, at most, a positive one. Our model indirectly supports theories
11which model waiting times as a mechanism to ration demand. If demand could be rationed
explicitly, waiting times should be below or at most equal to the cost minimising level,
which is in contrast with our ￿ndings. Although our results suggest that waiting times
might have a strong rationing rationale, they do not imply that waiting times are an
optimal rationing system. As pointed out for example by Barzel (1974), waiting times
generate a loss to patients but do not generate bene￿ts for the providers (at least if
waiting time is weakly above the cost-minimising level). If expected bene￿t was perfectly
observable by the provider, an ideal rationing mechanism would provide swift treatment
to patients with high expected bene￿t, refuse treatment to patients with low expected
bene￿t, and set a waiting time which is strictly below the cost minimising level. Recent
policies that focus on the development of explicit prioritisation criteria (Siciliani and Hurst,
2005) might encourage clinicians in the future to rely more on explicit rationing and less
on waiting-time rationing.
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13Table 1: Description of variables
Variable name Description Source￿
(a) Hospital cost
totcost Total hospital cost (£000) DoH
(2002 real values using Treasury GDP de￿ ator)
(b) Waiting times
meanwait Mean wait in days HES
(c) Measures of activity
totspells Total inpatient spells (000) HES
totop Total outpatient attendances (000) DoH
(d) Case mix
emergadm Number of emergency admissions as % of total inpatient spells HES
hrgindrc HRG casemix index based on Reference Costs NHSIA
(e) E¢ ciency on use of resources
daycase Number of day cases as % of elective admissions HES
alos Average length of stay HES
(f) Capital inputs
avbeds Number of available beds DoH
(g) Quality of services
readmisnpc Emerg. readm. % within 28 days, all ages, age sex std DoH
(h) Competition
nhosp20km Number of hospitals within 20 km radius
(i) Dummy variables
london Trust is in London CIPFA
￿ DoH: Department of Health, HES: Hospital Episodes Statistics, NHSIA: National Health
Service Information Authority, CIPFA: The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy
14Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
totcost 440 104,731.5 42,563.7 26,096.4 260,045.0
meanwait 440 102.9 29.9 17.0 219.0
totspells 440 56.0 22.4 4.2 131.4
totop 440 215.6 87.8 35.5 609.3
emergadm 440 36.1 5.1 4.5 65.0
hrgindrc 440 93.7 7.1 75.5 163.4
daycase 439 50.1 8.0 0 77.2
alos 440 5.3 1.7 2.5 28.9
readmisnpc 385 5.8 0.9 3.7 10.2
avbeds 440 681.8 255.2 166.0 1,574.7
nhosp20km 359 4.5 4.8 1 19
london 440 0.1 0.4 0 1
y1998 440 0.3 0.4 0 1
y1999 440 0.3 0.4 0 1
y2000 440 0.2 0.4 0 1
y2001 440 0.2 0.4 0 1
15Table 3: Unbalanced pooled OLS regressions of total hospital cost
Dependent variable: log(totcost); Robust standard errors
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
lnmeanwait - 1.40 -0.93* -0.93* -0.76* -0.73* - 0.28 - 0.28
(lnmeanwait)2 0.29 0.21* 0.21** 0.17* 0.16* 0.07 0.07
lntotspells 0.55*** 0.3*** .27*** 0.28*** 0.34*** 0.62*** 0.65***
lntotop 0.38*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.23*** 0.24***
lnhrgindrc 1.2*** 0.81*** 0.83*** 0.8*** 0.77*** 0.73*** 0.72***
lnavbeds 0.4*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.35*** 0.14 0.10
emergadm -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.021 -0.011
daycase -0.002 -0.003* -0.004** -0.003*
lnalos 0.08 0.25*** 0.26**
readmisnpc 0.002 0.004
lnnhosp20km -0.002
london 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15**
y1999 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.15***
y2000 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.28***
y2001 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14***
constant 4.7** 4.5*** 4.4*** 4.3*** 4.4*** 3.9*** 3.9***
R2 0.86 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.9 0.89
RESET 0.1 0.5 0.5 1 1.2 2 1.8
Joint signi￿cancey 1.4 2.04 2.12 1.7 1.57 0.35 0.59
N 440 440 440 439 439 384 319
N_clusters 137 137 137 137 137 109 88
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; y Test for joint signi￿cance of lnmeanwait and lnmeanwait2
16Table 4: Unbalanced ￿xed e⁄ects regressions of total hospital cost
Dependent variable: log(totcost); Robust standard errors
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnmeanwait - 0.19 - 0.18 - 0.13 - 0.14 - 0.13 - 0.16
(lnmeanwait)2 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
lntotspells 0.16* 0.13 0.18** 0.18** 0.19** 0.02
lntotop 0.12* 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 0.10
lnavbeds 0.24*** 0.17** 0.17** 0.15** 0.23***
emergadm 0.0068** 0.0065* 0.0061* 0.003
daycase -0.00082 -0.001 -0.0011
lnalos 0.05 0.05
readmisnpc - 0.01
y1999 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***
y2000 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.17***
y2001 0.21*** 0.2*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.2***
constant 10*** 9*** 8.9*** 9*** 9*** 9.5***
R2 within 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
R2 between 0.71 0.82 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.86
R2 overall 0.68 0.81 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.76
corr(￿i;Xb) 0.64 0.69 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.71
￿ 0.3 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.27
￿u 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.27
￿e 0.065 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063
￿ 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95
Hausman 68.5*** 56*** 62*** 60.5*** 59.5*** 72.6***
Breusch-Pagan 234.2*** 260.4*** 249.5*** 243.3*** 236.7*** 241.2***
Joint signi￿cancey 5.6*** 2.7* 1.9 1.7 1.5 0.5
N 440 440 440 439 439 384
N_clusters 137 137 137 137 137 109
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; y Test for joint signi￿cance of lnmeanwait and lnmeanwait2Table 5: Unbalanced random e⁄ects regressions of total hospital cost
Dependent variable: log(totcost); Robust standard errors
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnmeanwait - 0.72 -0.55* -0.54* -0.5* -0.45* - 0.24
(lnmeanwait)2 0.17 0.13** 0.13** 0.12** 0.11** 0.06
lntotspells 0.36*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.35***
lntotop 0.31*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.23***
lnavbeds 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.39*** 0.35***
emergadm 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0017




y1999 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14***
y2000 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.19***
y2001 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.18***
constant 9.8*** 7.7*** 7.7*** 7.8*** 7.6*** 7***
R2 within 0.62 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.65
R2 between 0.77 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.9
R2 overall 0.8 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88
￿ 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.13
￿u 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.11
￿e 0.065 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063
￿ 0.87 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.75
Joint signi￿cancey 9.2** 6.4** 6.2** 5.1* 4.6* 3.8
N 440 440 440 439 439 384
N_clusters 137 137 137 137 137 109
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; y Test for joint signi￿cance of lnmeanwait and lnmeanwait2
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